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THE MORALITY OF FIDUCIARY LAW
PAUL B. MILLER*
ABSTRACT
Recent work of fiduciary theory has provided conceptual synthesis
requisite to understanding core fiduciary principles and the structure
of fiduciary liability. However, normative questions have received
only sporadic attention. What values animate fiduciary law? How
does, or should, fiduciary law prove responsive to them?
While in other areas of private law theory—notably, tort theory—
pioneering scholars went directly at normative questions like these,
fiduciary theory has been exceptional in the reticence shown toward
them. The reticence is sensible. Fiduciary principles are the product
of equity’s most extended and convoluted program of supplementing
surrounding law. They span several distinct forms of relationship
arising in markedly different settings.
In this Article, I develop a framework for analyzing the morality
of fiduciary law. The framework accomplishes four things. First, it
situates questions about the morality of fiduciary law within the
context of the general jurisprudential literature on the nature of law
and its normativity. Second, it explains the sense in which fiduciary
law is normatively complex by virtue of being structurally biplanar,
with general equitable principles (duty-imposing rules) overlain upon
legal and equitable principles (including, notably, power-conferring
rules) that define and enable legal forms of relationship character-
ized as fiduciary in equity. Third, it distinguishes the general
morality of fiduciary duties from the special morality of fiduciary
* Professor, Associate Dean for International and Graduate Programs, and Director of
the Notre Dame Program on Private Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful for
comments from Evan Criddle, Deborah DeMott, Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew Gold, Ethan Leib,
Nate Oman, and Julian Velasco.
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relationship types. Fourth, and finally, it provides an overview of loci
of value in fiduciary relationships, canvassing considerations of
general and special morality that give salience to the interests of
parties, third parties, and the public in rules that enable and
constrain the performance of fiduciary mandates.
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INTRODUCTION
Fiduciary law traverses wide and irregular terrain. With time,
equity has come to extend fiduciary duties to a highly diverse set of
relationships.1 Fiduciary law’s reach varies by jurisdiction but has
come to encompass relationships between parents and children,
guardians and wards, agents and principals, trustees and beneficia-
ries, executors and trustees of estates and the beneficiaries of same,
directors and corporations, and trustees and charities, to name just
a few.2 Furthermore, courts have shown increased willingness to
extend fiduciary duties ad hoc to relationships outside categories of
relationship of recognized fiduciary status.3
Equity has responded to this variegation partly by tailoring the
content of fiduciary duties by relationship type. Consider the duty
of loyalty.4 Some fiduciaries are subject to a sole-interest standard
of conduct, according to which they must avoid all unauthorized
conflicts of duty or interest.5 Others are subject to a best-interest
standard, under which their loyalty is assessed in terms of the
material impact of mandate performance on the pertinent interests
of beneficiaries.6 Yet others act under a solidarity standard, where-
by loyalty is a function of maintaining solidarity in the performance
of a mandate in which the fiduciary has an authorized beneficial
1. See Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAW 63, 76-89 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014) [hereinafter Miller,
Fiduciary Relationship]. See generally Paul B. Miller, The Identification of Fiduciary
Relationships, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW 367 (Evan J. Criddle, Paul B.
Miller & Robert H. Sitkoff eds., 2019) [hereinafter Miller, Identification].
2. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 42-62 (2011).
3. See Daniel B. Kelly, Fiduciary Principles in Fact-Based Fiduciary Relationships, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 3, 12-13.
4. See generally Andrew S. Gold, The Loyalties of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 176, 176 (analyzing various conceptions of
loyalty in fiduciary law); Andrew S. Gold, The Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 385, 385-86 [hereinafter Gold, Fiduciary Duty]
(discussing features of fiduciary loyalty, including breach of the duty of loyalty, remedies, and
modifications of the duty of loyalty).
5. See Gold, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 388.
6. See Lionel Smith, Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement
on Behalf of Another, 130 LAW Q. REV. 608, 611-12 (2014).
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stake.7 Similar tailoring is evident in the specification of standards
of conduct associated with other fiduciary duties.8
It is only relatively recently that fiduciary law has attracted the
kind of synthetic analysis that allows one to view it as a field unto
itself. Consistent with the need of synthesis, it should be unsurpris-
ing that fiduciary scholars have thus far focused mostly on provid-
ing high-level analyses of core concepts and principles. For example,
in other work, I have examined the conceptualization of fiduciary
relationships as well as the content and function of fiduciary duties.9
Others have addressed similar questions, again aiming to provide
synthesis.10
To this point, normative questions have received less attention.
In my work, I have limited myself to the relatively modest claim
that fiduciary duties and remedies are justified juridically on the
basis of formal properties of fiduciary relationships.11 I have not
staked claims about the value(s) implicated by fiduciary relation-
ships or how fiduciary duties and remedies do, or should, prove
responsive to them.12 But a few other theorists have. For example,
Hanoch Dagan and Sharon Hannes have argued that financial
fiduciary relationships are autonomy-enhancing inasmuch as the
delegation of power to fiduciaries enables beneficiaries to engage in
7. See Evan J. Criddle, Stakeholder Fiduciaries, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST: ETHICS,
POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND LAW 105, 106 (Paul B. Miller & Matthew Harding eds., 2020)
[hereinafter FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST].
8. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Other Fiduciary Duties: Implementing Loyalty and Care, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 419, 426-29.
9. See generally Miller, Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1; Miller, Identification, supra
note 1; Paul B. Miller, Dimensions of Fiduciary Loyalty, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
FIDUCIARY LAW 180 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) [hereinafter Miller,
Dimensions].
10. See, e.g., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1.
11. See, e.g., Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L.J. 969, 973 (2013)
[hereinafter Miller, Duties]; Paul B. Miller, Justifying Fiduciary Remedies, 63 U. TORONTO
L.J. 570, 601-02 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Remedies].
12. As will be evident in what follows, I shall not distinguish here between the positive
and critical morality of fiduciary law (that is, between the values to which it is responsive,
analyzed interpretively, and is properly to be responsive, analyzed critically). Juridical
justification belongs within, but does not exhaust, interpretive analysis of the posited morality
of law. See generally Paul B. Miller, Juridical Justification of Private Rights, in JUSTIFYING
PRIVATE RIGHTS (Michael Crawford et al. eds., forthcoming Feb. 2021) (manuscript at 12-13),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3534423 [https://perma.cc/Y22J-B9B3]. 
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pursuits that they value more highly.13 Tamar Frankel has argued
that the morality of fiduciary law is centrally concerned with the
value of trust.14 And Evan Criddle has argued that fiduciary law is
responsive to the republican value of non-domination.15
Each of these accounts has some plausibility. Setting aside
relationships that structure administration of the affairs of inca-
pable persons, it seems reasonable to think that fiduciary law often
enhances autonomy insofar as it enables us to shift burdens of
judgment and action to representatives.16 The formation of fiduciary
relationships usually features an “entrustment” of power, and the
formation or performance of a fiduciary relationship might implicate
trust in some richer sense.17 Further, to the extent that all fiduciary
relationships implicate representation,18 it seems reasonable to
suppose that fiduciary law is responsive to the value of non-domi-
nation.19
And this is not all. As I shall explain, fiduciary relationships
implicate other important values. For example, those of protecting
and promoting personal and social welfare, enabling care for de-
pendents and those in need, and facilitating cooperation in joint
pursuits.20 Most fiduciary relationships call for the exercise of power
in advancement of welfare interests of beneficiaries.21 Virtually all
of the arrangements in which we provide for dependents are struc-
tured by way of fiduciary mandate.22 And all forms of organization
13. Hanoch Dagan & Sharon Hannes, Managing Our Money: The Law of Financial
Fiduciaries as a Private Law Institution, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 1, at 91, 105.
14. FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 271-78.
15. Evan J. Criddle, Liberty in Loyalty: A Republican Theory of Fiduciary Law, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 993, 995 (2017).
16. See Dagan & Hannes, supra note 13, at 105.
17. For more qualified perspectives on the value of trust and its significance for fiduciary
law, see Joshua Getzler, “As If.” Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U.L.REV. 973,
974, 980 (2011); Matthew Harding, Trust and Fiduciary Law, 33 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 81,
84-88 (2013); Matthew Harding, Contracts, Fiduciary Relationships and Trust, in FIDUCIARIES
AND TRUST, supra note 7, at 55, 67-69.
18. See Paul B. Miller, Fiduciary Representation, in FIDUCIARY GOVERNMENT 21, 38-40
(Evan J. Criddle et al. eds., 2018).
19. See Criddle, supra note 15, at 995.
20. See infra Part III.C.
21. Miller, supra note 18, at 24-25.
22. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Ben Chen, Fiduciary Principles in Family Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 227, 227-28.
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supplied in law and at equity enable cooperation through fiduciary
governance.23
What might all of this indicate about the morality of fiduciary
law? In what follows I will argue that, in critical terms, it counsels
avoidance of two mistakes: the first being normatively reductive
analysis of the morality of fiduciary law (that is, in terms of a single
value or limited set of values), and the second being structurally
reductive treatment of the morality of fiduciary law in terms of
fiduciary duties to the exclusion of power-conferring rules impli-
cated in the constitution of fiduciary mandates. As for constructive
indications, I shall argue two correlative points: first, the morality
of fiduciary law is pluralistic as to its values and loci; and second,
fiduciary law is structurally biplanar and thus inevitably norma-
tively complex. Biplanarity and complexity are a function of the
origin, function, and morality of the power-conferring rules upon
which equity has engrafted fiduciary duties.24
The argument will unfold as follows. Part I provides a general
framework for analysis of the morality of law that I assume in what
follows. Part II explains the structural biplanarity of fiduciary law
and shows how it generates normative complexity. Part III outlines
loci of value in fiduciary relationships and shows how these values
imply that the morality of fiduciary law is pluralistic. Then, I con-
clude with reflections on what the account of the morality of fidu-
ciary law provided here might mean for understanding the wider
normative relationship of equity to law.
I. GENERAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The morality of fiduciary law is messy; here, much as ever, clarity
might be achieved by settling a framework of analysis. That which
is outlined below assumes arguendo the truth of moral realism and
the relative advantages of interest theories of rights in analyzing
23. See, e.g., Julian Velasco, Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 61; Mohsen Manesh, Fiduciary Principles in
Unincorporated Entity Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at
79; Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Fiduciary Principles in Charities and Other Nonprofits, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 103.
24. See infra Part II.
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the morality of private law.25 It supposes that law, to the extent that
it does or should prove responsive to objective moral value(s),
manifests responsiveness in its recognition of, and apt responses to,
the moral salience of the interests of persons.
A. Persons
I take it that law is invariably addressed to legal persons26 and
that it addresses persons in their capacity to engage, directly or
indirectly (for example, via agents or representatives), in practical
reasoning. Practical reason is defined as “the general human
capacity for resolving, through reflection, the question of what one
is to do”27 and involves the identification of, differentiation between,
deliberation with, planning in light of, and conforming of one’s
actions to, various kinds of practical reason, including those given
by, and for, law.
Additionally, I take it that legal persons are, directly or indirectly,
the focal objects of law and associated practices of lawmaking and
enforcement.28 To say that persons are the objects of law is simply
to say that the law’s aims and functions are to advance or secure
certain interests that persons do or can have and goods that are or
can be in issue for them. Allow me to briefly elaborate.
First, in saying that the law is addressed to legal persons, I mean
to emphasize that it supplies normative guidance to individual legal
persons. I do not mean that the content of the law addresses persons
individually, for that would be incompatible with its generality.29
25. It is thus broadly consistent with the philosophy of Joseph Raz. See generally JOSEPH
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1975) [hereinafter RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON]; JOSEPH
RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986) [hereinafter RAZ, MORALITY]; Joseph Raz, On the
Nature of Rights, 93 MIND 194, 199 (1984). I say “broadly consistent” in that I depart from Raz
on the ontological basis of values and dissent from his service conception of legal authority
and associated views on the relationship between law and practical reason.
26. By “legal persons,” I mean those natural or artificial persons identified as “persons”
by, and for the sake of, law. It would be cumbersome to add the adjectival “legal” to every apt
reference to “person” in what follows. Thus, unless otherwise indicated, subsequent mention
of “person” or “persons” reference legal persons.
27. Practical Reason, STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Jan. 14, 2020), https://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/practical-reason/ [https://perma.cc/29Y8-R6YM].
28. That is to say, primary or principal. For discussion, see JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW
AND NATURAL RIGHTS 9-11 (1980).
29. However, enforcement actions, including judgments and courts orders, are typically
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Rather, I mean that, insofar as a core moral aim and social function
of law is one of supplying normative guidance,30 that guidance is of
necessity addressed to persons individually, insofar as legal per-
sonality entails individuated capacities for rational deliberation and
action.31 This holds irrespective of the fact that the law’s objects
include relationships and associations because, to be effective, the
law must (and does) guide persons who deliberate and act individu-
ally with respect to their interactions (relationships and associa-
tions) with others.
Second, in saying that legal persons are the focal objects of the
law, I mean, again, to emphasize that the law is a means by which
to secure or advance the interests of legal persons, and so to realize
the value(s) that give these interests their moral salience. Some-
times, the law protects or advances the interests that legal persons
have personally, each in their own right (that is, as individuals).32
But the law also protects and advances shared interests, including
those that we can enjoy only relationally.33 Differentiating the ways
in which the law takes the interests of legal persons as its objects
will become important when we consider the sense in which the nor-
mativity of law is oriented by the moral salience of these interests.
B. Interests
I have said that legal persons are the focal objects of law.34 But to
say this is to say nothing, yet, as to how the law shows concern for
persons. In my view, the law generally cannot effectively protect,
addressed to individuals and specific circumstances in which a matter of law or equity was
put in issue with respect to them. See Stephen A. Smith, Why Courts Make Orders (and What
This Tells Us About Damages), 64 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 51, 51-52 (2011); STEPHEN A.
SMITH, RIGHTS, WRONGS, AND INJUSTICES 48 (2019).
30. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 2-3, 6-9 (1961). 
31. See Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends: Reciprocity and
Responsibility in Personal Relations, 6 PHIL. PERSPS. 305, 312-15 (1992).
32. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the
People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 243 (2008) (“Tort
law is our primary fall-back method of empowering ordinary people to remedy injustices to
themselves through their courts.”).
33. For discussion in the context of criminal law, see R.A. Duff, Relational Reasons and
the Criminal Law, in 2 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 175, 179-80 (Leslie Green &
Brian Leiter eds., 2013).
34. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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empower, or guide persons other than by addressing the moral
salience of a specific aspect of their personality and its social or
other practical extension(s).35 Put simply, the law must disaggregate
the elements and extensions of personality that have moral salience.
Consistent with this, in what follows I shall suppose that the law
recognizes and treats as morally salient specific interests of
persons.36 And, as I shall explain below, the law delineates interests
primarily by developing (and, as necessary, calibrating) the content,
juxtaposition, and enforcement of legal rules so as to prove aptly
responsive to them.37
By focusing on specific interests rather than taking the moral
measure of persons more widely, the law manifests a kind of moral
economy of attention; one that, among other things, might increase
the likelihood that each will be treated according to their moral
desert. Rules tailored to specific interests can be expected to produce
better—clearer and more manageable—normative guidance than
those that are more amorphous in singling out matters of moral
concern and the ontological foundation of same.38
I have suggested that the interests singled out by law may be
enjoyed by legal persons on a personal or relational (shared) basis.39
Personal interests pertain to a characteristic, potential, good or bad
outcome, or aim that legal persons can be understood to have, enjoy,
or suffer individually. Many personal interests—for example, in
physical and psychological integrity, in being treated with dignity,
in freedom of conscience and movement—are protected by stand-
alone rules in tort and criminal law.40 By contrast, relational
interests are those that arise within the context of, or are premised
35. An exception might be made for broad ascriptions of status borne by persons, which
attribute a complex set of rights, powers, capacities, and the like to an individual.
36. Here I follow RAZ,MORALITY, supra note 25, at 165-66, in structure but not substance,
in that I do not restrict the kinds of “interests” that can ground rights to welfare interests. On
the insufficiency of welfarist accounts of the kinds of interests that can ground rights, see Leif
Wenar, The Nature of Rights, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 223, 240-43 (2005).
37. See infra Part I.D.
38. See Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, General and Specific Legal Rules,
161 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 329, 329-30, 345 (2005).
39. See supra Part I.A.
40. See, e.g., Arthur Ripstein, Philosophy of Tort Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 656, 656-57 (Jules L. Coleman et al. eds., 2002);
Duff, supra note 33, at 179-80.
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on an ability to form, a relationship or association with others.41
Many relational interests—for example, in solidarity, care, and
cooperation—are served by rules that facilitate and regulate various
legal forms of relationship and association.42
C. Values
If interests focus the law’s concern for legal persons, moral values
ground their normativity. In taking this position, again, I align
myself with moral realism43 and do so here arguendo.
In law, as in other contexts, the attribution of moral salience to
an interest on the basis of a proposition about moral value is a func-
tion of the practical judgment of person(s) acting on their own behalf
(engaging personal moral judgment) or on behalf of others (engaging
in representative moral judgment).44 For law, to the extent that a
given legal rule encapsulates a judgment as to the moral salience of
an interest, the posited morality of the law is that identified by the
officials who lay it down or otherwise give authoritative recognition
to it; thus, the posited morality of law is the product of representa-
tive moral judgment.45 The critical morality of law, by contrast,
consists in well-founded judgments—personal or representative—
that a given legal rule ought to prove responsive (or more perfectly
responsive) to an interest and its value, or (in the absence of a rule)
that there ought to be a legal rule to protect or advance an interest
and so to respond aptly to its value.46
41. Leon Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REV. 460, 462 (1934). For general
philosophical discussion, see CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF (1989).
42. Cf. Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Relational Rights of Children, 48 CONN. L. REV. 741,
744 (2016) (arguing for laws that advance children’s interests by supporting children’s
relational interests); Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the
American Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 18 (1983) (“[T]he law of defamation ... remedies
a wrongful disruption in the ‘relational interest’ that an individual has in maintaining
personal esteem in the eyes of others.”).
43. Understood as involving a commitment to there being moral facts and values and to
the truth value of claims about moral facts and values. See DAVID O. BRINK, MORAL REALISM
AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 14 (1989); DAVID ENOCH, TAKING MORALITY SERIOUSLY 1-8
(2011); T.M. SCANLON, BEING REALISTIC ABOUT REASONS 41 & n.41 (2014).
44. See BARBARA HERMAN, THE PRACTICE OF MORAL JUDGMENT 77-78, 83-87 (1993).
45. See Jeremy Waldron, Representative Lawmaking, 89 B.U. L. REV. 335, 354 (2009).
46. See Peter Cane, Morality, Law and Conflicting Reasons for Action, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
59, 63-66 (2012). 
1360 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:1349
To the extent that one’s interest lies with the posited morality of
law, the task of the interpretive theorist is to identify claims of
value expressly made in the law or that are implied given the
content and material context of a legal rule.47 To the extent that one
is concerned with the law’s moral shortcomings or unfulfilled moral
promises, one’s task is that of the critical theorist: cataloging the
ways in which the law fails—entirely or adequately—to protect the
interests and values that it ought to protect (that is, those in
relation to which there are decisive moral reasons for lawmaking or
reform).48
D. Reasons
Law proves responsive to interests and underlying values in part
through stipulation of the content of legal rules, the articulation of
juridical reasons for legal rules, and through enforcement and
reasons for judgment (that is, reasons responsive to applicable rules
and the material facts of a grievance on which judgment is sought).49
Legal rules give reasons, and reasons are given for legal rules.50
Both instances of reason-giving implicate practical reasons (that is,
reasons that figure in our private and public deliberation about how
we ought to act).51
A given value can be understood to contribute to the justification
of a rule in light of the rule’s intended and actual impact on the
interest(s) the rule is meant to protect or advance.52 Values con-
tribute to the justification of rules by means of the practical reasons
that can be derived therefrom for the rule and for compliance with
or enforcement of it (or for compliance with and enforcement of legal
rules in general).53 All of this is consistent with my earlier stipula-
tion that a core function of law is the provision of normative
47. See Miller, supra note 12 (manuscript at 21).
48. See id. (manuscript at 9).
49. See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 19) (proffering tort law as an example).
50. Id. (manuscript at 11-12); see David Enoch, Reason-Giving and the Law, in 1 OXFORD
STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 26-28 (Leslie Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
51. See RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 25, at 28-33; FINNIS, supra note 28, at 12, 14-
16; NEIL MACCORMICK, PRACTICAL REASON IN LAW AND MORALITY 209 (2008).
52. See Miller, supra note 12 (manuscript at 20).
53. See id.
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guidance; its mode of address of legal persons is a matter of pro-
viding the latter with practically reasonable guidance.54
The interpretive theorist interested in excavating the posited
morality of law will aim at identifying interests advanced or
protected by a given legal rule and the values thereby incorporated
in law, and at determining whether and how those interests and
values resolve in specific juridical reasons given by and for the
rule(s).55 Sometimes propositions as to the posited morality of law
(assertions or arguments about the interests protected or values
advanced by a given rule) will be given explicitly as juridical reasons
by lawmakers.56 Otherwise, they may be inferred from the content
of the rule or from public statements made by lawmakers in
connection with it.57 Doubtless, the interpretive theorist’s task will
often be difficult, not least because in some cases none of these
methods will enable her to draw confident conclusions about the
posited morality of law.58
The fact that the law supplies normative guidance by giving
practical reasons obviously does not imply that it is successful in the
guidance it gives. Sometimes the guidance is inscrutable or un-
sound.59 The critical theorist performs an essential service in
pointing out gaps and infirmities in the moral quality of guidance
that the law provides.60 That said, most political communities aspire
to the provision of sound, practically reasonable guidance through
law.61 Whether that aspiration is met turns on the quality of the
practical reasons given by and for a legal rule or framework of legal
rules.62 When lawmakers provide practically reasonable justification
for laws, they will have established a robust normative nexus
54. See supra Part I.A.
55. See Miller, supra note 12 (manuscript at 8-9).
56. See id. (manuscript at 20).
57. See id.
58. See id. (manuscript at 17).
59. As Raz, for example, repeatedly emphasizes. See RAZ,MORALITY, supra note 25, at 41-
42, 62; Joseph Raz, The Problem of Authority: Revisiting the Service Conception, 90 MINN. L.
REV. 1003, 1022-23 (2006).
60. See Miller, supra note 12 (manuscript at 9).
61. Cf. Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Jurisprudence, 9 LEGAL THEORY 241, 244, 256, 267
(2003) (“[O]ne can abstract from the details of natural law moral and political theory.”); see
also SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 338 (2011) (“[T]he law must solve moral problems without
creating new ones in the process.”).
62. See Murphy, supra note 61, at 244.
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between the law, the interests it advances or protects, the reasons
given publicly for the law, and the value propositions that the latter
invoke or upon which they rely. In such cases, ceteris paribus, we
can be confident that the law succeeds morally in the normative
guidance that it supplies.
E. Rules
I have thus far referred only elliptically to legal rules, noting their
significance in guiding persons and protecting or advancing morally
valuable interests. I shall now comment directly on legal rules gen-
erally and the rules germane to fiduciary law and its morality.
Following Hart, I take it that legal rules guide the practical
reasoning and behavior of legal persons acting in private (unofficial)
and public (official) capacities.63 As directed to persons acting in a
private or unofficial capacity, primary legal rules and certain
secondary rules specify how we may or must act and interact.64 As
directed to persons acting in a public or official capacity (including,
notably, within legal institutions), secondary rules also specify how
a legal system is to operate.65 For present purposes, it will suffice to
note the distinction between duty-imposing primary rules and
power-conferring secondary rules insofar as they govern and struc-
ture the actions and interactions of legal persons acting in a private
capacity.
Duty-imposing rules are familiar and straightforward: they
specify mandatory standards of conduct for their addressees.66 Much
attention is lavished on these rules in private law theory.67 But, as
Hart recognized, private law includes power-conferring rules, too.68
These rules are at least as significant to private law as are duty-
63. See HART, supra note 30, at 96.
64. See id. at 78-79; William C. Starr, Law and Morality in H.L.A. Hart’s Legal
Philosophy, 67 MARQ. L. REV. 673, 676 (1984).
65. See HART, supra note 30, at 91-92, 94-95.
66. Id. at 78-85; see also Starr, supra note 64, at 676.
67. See, e.g., Curtis Bridgeman & John C.P. Goldberg, Do Promises Distinguish Contract
from Tort?, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 873, 876 (2012); Hanoch Dagan, The Utopian Promise of
Private Law, 66 U. TORONTO L.J. 392, 410 (2016); Curtis Bridgeman, Civil Recourse or Civil
Powers?, 39 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011).
68. HART, supra note 30, at 27-28.
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imposing rules.69 Power-conferring rules enable legal persons to
effectively transact, to form relationships and enter into or establish
associations with others, and to incur voluntarily undertaken duties
on these bases.70 It is primarily by making use of power-conferring
rules that natural and artificial persons invoke the law to change
the normative landscape within which they act and interact.71
As is true of much of the rest of private law, fiduciary law
implicates an array of duty-imposing and power-conferring rules.72
Fiduciary law both enables and constrains parties to fiduciary
relationships, as well as third parties in their interactions with
grantors, fiduciaries, and beneficiaries.73 The province of fiduciary
law has grown incrementally as equity has extended duty-imposing
rules (fiduciary duties) to an ever-widening set of relationships.74
Those relationships bear common formal properties.75 But the
constitution (formation and indicia of legal form) of fiduciary rela-
tionships, and so the occasion for the imposition of fiduciary duties,
is not governed by fiduciary law.76 It is instead enabled and
regulated by various sets of power-conferring rules developed for
particular types of relationships and associations characterized as
fiduciary in equity. These sets of power-conferring rules may
originate in law or in other fields within equity. For example, both
the formation of a valid express trust and the mechanisms for the
69. See Dagan, supra note 67, at 410; see also Bridgeman & Goldberg, supra note 67, at
876.
70. See HART, supra note 30, at 27-28.
71. See the discussion of powers in DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE
123-85 (2012) (exploring how people use ownership and consent to shape their normative
landscape).
72. For a similar perspective on the legal rules that enable contracting, see generally
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power, and Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1726 (2008).
73. Criddle, supra note 15, at 1016-17, 1026.
74. See Tamar Frankel, The Rise of Fiduciary Law, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVER-
NANCE (Sept. 10, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/09/10/the-rise-of-fiduciary-law/
[https://perma.cc/ARM7-G94P].
75. See Miller, Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1, at 73.
76. See Paul B. Miller, Principles of Public Fiduciary Administration, in BOUNDARIES OF
STATE, BOUNDARIES OF RIGHTS 251, 253 (Tsvi Kahana & Anat Scolnicov eds., 2016); cf. Scott
FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303, 319 (1999)
(“Fiduciary duties are often not set forth—sometimes not even referred to—in agreements
between parties.”); Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at 368. See generally Fiduciary Duties,
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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devolution of fiduciary powers on trustees are enabled and con-
strained by power-conferring rules found in the law of trusts.77
Likewise, the incorporation, devolution, and definition of the fidu-
ciary mandates of corporate directors are matters for power-
conferring rules established by corporate law.78 The same may be
said of each and every other kind of status-based fiduciary relation-
ship.79
II. STRUCTURAL BIPLANARITY AND THE MORALITY OF
FIDUCIARY LAW
The morality of fiduciary law is pluralistic owing to variety in the
salience held by the interests of persons in the legal rules that
enable and regulate fiduciary relationships. As I will explain below,
there is reason to think that fiduciary duties are amenable to
general moral evaluation and justification in terms of values put in
issue by all fiduciary relationships.80 But there is little reason to
think that the general morality of fiduciary law is normatively
monistic. And, in any case, variety in the moral salience of the
interests of persons in the formation and performance of different
kinds of fiduciary mandate implies that fiduciary law is normatively
pluralistic when analyzed in terms of the special morality of
different fiduciary relationship types.81
To appreciate that the morality of fiduciary law is pluralistic, it
helps to understand the way in which it is (also) normatively
complex in its amalgamation of considerations of general and
77. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles in Trust Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 41.
78. See generally Velasco, supra note 23; Julian Velasco, How Many Fiduciary Duties Are
There in Corporate Law?, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231 (2010).
79. For present purposes I shall restrict my attention to status-based fiduciary
relationships. It is unclear what role power-conferring rules have in the constitution of fact-
based fiduciary relationships, partly because the latter are irregular. See Kelly, supra note
3, at 3-4; Andrew S. Gold, Trust and Advice, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST, supra note 7, at 35,
47. See generally Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS,
AND FIDUCIARY LAW 25 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2016) (discussing status-based
fiduciary relationships).
80. See infra Part II.B.
81. On special morality more widely, see generally Michael O. Hardimon, Role Obliga-
tions, 91 J. PHILOSOPHY 333 (1994); Samuel Scheffler, Relationships and Responsibilities, 26
PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 189 (1997); SIMON KELLER, PARTIALITY (2013).
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special morality. The normative complexity of fiduciary law is a
product of its structural biplanarity. In what follows, I explain the
sense in which fiduciary law is structurally biplanar insofar as it is
premised on the extension by equity of duty-imposing rules
(fiduciary duties) to legal forms of relationship and association that
are constituted through variable sets of power-conferring rules. I
then explain how structural biplanarity generates normative com-
plexity insofar as it (a) implies the possibility of a general morality
of fiduciary duties but (b) requires recognition of the special
morality of the power-conferring rules that enable and undergird
fiduciary mandates.
A. Structural Biplanarity in Fiduciary Law
The morality of fiduciary law is a matter of the moral salience of
the interests of various differently situated persons in fiduciary
relationships and, by extension, in the undertaking, performance,
and termination of fiduciary mandates. To appreciate this, one must
understand a basic feature of fiduciary liability: it is relationally
structured.82 Fiduciary duties are triggered by the formation of
fiduciary relationships.83 Fiduciary duties are thus secondary to
fiduciary relationships: they assume the existence of a fiduciary
relationship and, absent that relational underpinning, have no
juridical or factual basis.84 That is, as a matter of law, they have
nothing to which to attach, given that they are not free-standing
conduct rules.85 And as a practical matter, they have no conduct to
shape, given that, absent an underlying fiduciary mandate, there is
nothing that a would-be fiduciary can be understood to have
undertaken to do, representatively, for another.86
The fact that fiduciary duties are integrally linked to fiduciary
relationships has important implications for our understanding of
fiduciary law taken in whole. For present purposes, the most
important is to notice that the duty-imposing rules through which
82. See generally Miller, Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1.
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equity attaches fiduciary principles to various particular fiduciary
relationships are contingent upon the existence and operation of
power-conferring rules that enable and regulate the formation,
performance, and termination of fiduciary relationships.87
When I say that fiduciary law is structurally biplanar, I mean to
capture this interaction of rules across two levels: fiduciary duty-
imposing rules on the one hand, and nonfiduciary power-conferring
rules on the other. Fiduciary duties are imposed on the basis of
relationship characterizations conducted in equity.88 But relation-
ships so characterized (that is, treated as fiduciary in equity) are
constituted through the engagement of power-conferring rules
stipulated other than by fiduciary law.89 Put otherwise, the exten-
sion of fiduciary duties is premised on a secondary rendering, in
equity, of a primary legal form of relationship or association.90
Allow me to explain. As I have detailed elsewhere, equity has
extended fiduciary status to categories of relationship on the basis
that one of the parties (the fiduciary) has been granted a fiduciary
mandate (a mandate and set of powers through which she is to act
representatively).91 This is a characterization that picks out formal
properties of all fiduciary relationships.92 But it is secondary, inso-
far as the properties are legal or juridical and not merely factual
incidents of relationships.93 Equity seizes upon legal incidents of
legal forms of relationship and association that are common across
the forms taken collectively.94 Notably, it seizes upon incidents that
suggest that one party or group within the relationship or associa-
tion have been authorized to act representatively for others.95
87. For contrasting views on the place of fiduciary principles in equity, compare Henry E.
Smith, Why Fiduciary Law Is Equitable, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW,
supra note 1, at 261, 281-82, with Paul B. Miller, Equity as Supplemental Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY 92, 98-100, 101-03 (Dennis Klimchuk
et al. eds., 2020).
88. See PAUL FINN, FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS 1-3 (1977).
89. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; see also FINN, supra note 88, at 1-3;
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76.
90. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text; see also FINN, supra note 88, at 1-3;
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76.
91. See Miller, supra note 18, at 39-40.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76.
95. Id.; FINN, supra note 88, at 2; Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40.
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But note that equity, despite providing for the extension of
fiduciary duties, does not supply rules that provide for the formation
of fiduciary relationships. It does not, in other words, presume to
define and develop terms that enable and govern mandates of
personal representation.96 Indeed, there are no general rules
establishing such terms in fiduciary law or elsewhere. Fiduciary law
regulates the exercise of authority by a fiduciary but is not a source
of such authority.97 Instead, fiduciary law regulates mandates
founded under discrete sets of power-conferring rules developed for
various legal forms of relationship and association.98 One might say
that the fiduciary mandates enjoyed, respectively, by directors,
trustees, and agents, originate in, and are regulated by, sets of
power-conferring rules established by trust law, corporate law, and
the law of agency.99 But even this is insufficiently specific. In tracing
the mandate enjoyed by a director of a corporation, say, to the
power-conferring rules that enable it, one must first determine the
type and jurisdiction of incorporation. The rules governing the
incorporation of a nonprofit corporation in Nebraska cannot be
assimilated with those governing the incorporation of a business in
Delaware.100 The same point holds for the power-conferring rules
enabling fiduciary mandates associated with other categories of
fiduciary relationship.
To recognize the structural biplanarity of fiduciary law is, then,
to recognize that fiduciary law is oriented toward, and is responsive
to, relationship types defined by power-conferring rules apt to the
type in a given jurisdiction. Again, fiduciary duties have nothing on
which to operate absent these rules.101 But this is not to diminish
the significance of equity’s contribution in the extension of duty-
imposing rules to fiduciary relationships. Its contribution is crucial,
96. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
97. Miller, supra note 76, at 253.
98. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
99. This is exemplified in leading doctrinal surveys of fiduciary principles in these fields.
See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Principles in Agency Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 23; Sitkoff, Fiduciary Principles, supra note
77; Velasco, supra note 23.
100. See Alyssa Gregory, Best States to Incorporate a Business, BALANCE SMALL BUS. (Mar.
29, 2019), https://www.thebalancesmb.com/best-states-to-incorporate-a-business-4178799
[https://perma.cc/SR3Q-9285].
101. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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even if secondary. It consists in (a) the articulation of properties
common to mandates of personal representation and (b) the articu-
lation and extension of fiduciary duties and other principles to
same.102 It is by virtue of the latter that equity makes its interven-
tion felt, taking the law as found, but adjusting it so as to make it
more likely that a fiduciary will respect the representative nature
of his charge.103
B. The General Morality of (Fiduciary) Duty-Imposing Rules
Equity imposes fiduciary duties on relationships it deems fidu-
ciary.104 Again, fiduciary liability is relationally structured insofar
as (equitable) obligations are ascribed on the basis of relationship
construction conducted in equity.105 But I have emphasized this
construction, though guided by form,106 is secondary insofar as it is
one made of the legal or juridical incidents of primary legal forms of
relationship or association that implicate fiduciary mandates.
I have underscored variety in the nature of fiduciary mandates
and associated practices of representation across status-based
fiduciary relationships.107 I have noted that the different primary
legal forms of relationship and association that equity deems
fiduciary are constituted by different sets of power-conferring
rules.108 And, with others, I have observed that equity responds to
variegation in the nature of fiduciary mandates in part by modulat-
ing the content of fiduciary duties.109 However, none of this should
be taken as denying that fiduciary law is a field defined by common
concepts, principles, and structural features—points emphasized by
102. See Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76; Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40.
103. On this feature of equitable intervention more generally—encapsulated in the maxim
that equity follows the law—see Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C.L.REV.
217, 275-79 (2018); Samuel L. Bray, Equity: Notes on the American Reception, in EQUITY AND
LAW 31 (John C.P. Goldberg et al. eds., 2019); Henry E. Smith, Equity as Meta-Law, 130 YALE
L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 47) (on file with author).
104. See supra Part II.A.
105. See generally Miller, Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1.
106. That is, guided by a conception of the formal properties shared by fiduciary
relationships.
107. See supra Part II.A.
108. See supra Part II.A.
109. See Criddle, supra note 7, at 109; Gold, Fiduciary Duty, supra note 4, at 385-86.
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myself and others in prior work.110 Rather, fiduciary law is defined
by the common set of equitable obligations that equity extends to
relationships that it treats as having formal properties in com-
mon.111 These features, in turn, indicate the possibility of a general
morality of fiduciary law.
If a general morality of fiduciary law is to be elucidated success-
fully, it will involve (a) the articulation of general moral interests in
fiduciary relationships; (b) explication of these interests in terms of
the formal properties of fiduciary relationships; (c) specification of
the values that give identified interests their moral salience; and (d)
an analysis showing how fiduciary duties are responsive to the
salience of identified interests and underlying values. The result
would be an account of the general morality not of fiduciary law in
its entirety but rather of duty-imposing rules (fiduciary duties)
understood in light of values reasonably believed to be at issue in all
fiduciary relationships.
As noted in my introductory remarks, fiduciary theorists who
have developed accounts of the morality of fiduciary law have
focused on fiduciary duties (duty-imposing rules) and, sometimes,
the properties of fiduciary relationships.112 Some of these accounts
might be questioned over doubts about the generality of the
morality identified with fiduciary law. Thus, for example, trust-
based theories have not shown that robust personal trust is impli-
cated in all fiduciary relationships, that trust has inherent moral
value, or that enforceable fiduciary duties are trust-reinforcing.113
Much the same is true of arguments that the fiduciary duty of
loyalty is justified by the moral value of loyalty, framed as a
virtue.114 They fail to establish that juridical conceptions of loyalty
110. See, e.g., Miller, Fiduciary Relationship, supra note 1; Miller, Identification, supra note
1; Ernest J. Weinrib, The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U.TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975); FINN, supra note
88; Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983); D. Gordon Smith, The
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 (2002); Lionel Smith,
Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring the Loyal Exercise of Judgement on Behalf of Another, 130
LAW Q. REV. 608 (2014).
111. See FINN, supra note 88, at 1-5.
112. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text.
113. See Miller, Duties, supra note 11, at 995-99.
114. See generally Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience—A Justification of a
Stringent Profit-Stripping Rule, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 763 (2008); Irit Samet, Fiduciary
Loyalty as Kantian Virtue, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1,
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track moral ones, that loyalty is a virtue or is otherwise inherently
morally valuable, or that fiduciary relationships are uniformly
premised on valid moral expectations of loyalty.115
Doubtless, it will be difficult to satisfactorily distill the general
morality of fiduciary duties. However, my main point has been to
emphasize that the common concepts, principles, and structural
features of fiduciary law invite the effort. Without pretending
thoroughness, I offer two hypotheses: first, a normatively monistic
account is unlikely to prove satisfactory; and second, a normatively
pluralistic account is most likely to be successful if it encompasses
the values of negative liberty (non-domination), personal and social
welfare, and positive liberty or autonomy (self-authorship).116 These
three axes of value reflect the abiding moral concern that all
fiduciaries (a) refrain from self-interested appropriation of fiduciary
powers;117 (b) devote themselves to the advancement of their bene-
ficiaries’ interests;118 and (c) remain faithful to grantors’ intentions
in the performance of fiduciary mandates.119
C. The Special Morality of (Nonfiduciary) Power-Conferring Rules
Fiduciary duties are occasioned by the formation of relationships
that equity characterizes as fiduciary.120 And fiduciary duties con-
strain the performance of fiduciary mandates within the context of
these relationships.121 As noted above, because fiduciary law works
at 125.
115. See, e.g., J.E. Penner, Is Loyalty a Virtue, and Even If It Is, Does It Really Help Explain
Fiduciary Liability?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 159;
Stephen A. Smith, The Deed, Not the Motive: Fiduciary Law Without Loyalty, in CONTRACT,
STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 79, at 213; Miller, Dimensions, supra note 9, at 180-
82.
116. See generally W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1930); FINNIS, supra note 28. My
argument for pluralism is largely interpretive and foundationalist; that is, it is driven by
recognition that fiduciary law is most plausibly interpreted as responsive to more than one
foundational value. For a different, legal realist argument for pluralism, see generally
HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW
THEORY (2013).
117. See Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76.
118. See id.
119. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
513, 563 (2015).
120. See supra Part II.A.
121. See FINN, supra note 88, at 1; Smith, supra note 110, at 1483-84.
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with common constructs—of relationship and duty—it seems
amenable to general moral analysis.122 However, it should be
remembered that equity employs these constructs in relation to
independently stipulated sets of legal rules.123 More specifically, it
treats as “fiduciary” legal forms of relationship and association
constituted juridically by nonfiduciary power-conferring rules. These
are the rules that define the contours of a given type of relationship
or association; permit courts to differentiate between (and thus to
police the boundaries of) legal forms; and enable persons to make
use of forms in structuring their own affairs, interactions with
others, and cooperative undertakings.
The power-conferring rules that enable the formation, alteration,
and termination of fiduciary mandates do not follow a fixed pattern.
They might include rules specifying the qualifications or presumed
capacities of parties; informal or formal mechanisms by which the
parties may signify their intentions to confer, alter, or resign from
a mandate; minimum content of a mandate (for example, going to
fiduciary powers, mandate purposes, or beneficiaries); and criteria
governing judicial construction of an instrument purporting to
establish a mandate.124 But the range and content of the power-
conferring rules varies considerably.125 And it bears emphasis that,
though patterns in these rules enable us to speak abstractly about
legal forms of relationship or association,126 the rules themselves are
specified and operative at a more granular level. They are specified
variably by jurisdiction for specific subtypes (subsidiary forms) of
relationships or associations. Thus, the power-conferring rules that
enable the formation, alteration, and dissolution of a nonprofit
corporation will differ from those specified for benefit corporations,
business corporations, and governmental corporations.127 Similarly,
the power-conferring rules that enable the formation, alteration,
122. See supra Part II.B.
123. See supra Part II.A.
124. See FINN, supra note 88, at 1-4 (noting that the term fiduciary “provid[es] a veil behind
which individual rules and principles have been developed”); Miller & Gold, supra note 119,
at 516 (describing mandates).
125. See Frankel, supra note 110, at 795.
126. See FINN, supra note 88, at 5.
127. See Frankel, supra note 110, at 795; ROBERT R. KEATINGE & ANN E. CONAWAY,
KEATINGE AND CONAWAY ON CHOICE OF BUSINESS ENTITY § 1:1 (2020).
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and windup of a charitable trust will differ from those specified for
conventional donative trusts, real estate investment trusts, and
business trusts.128
If my suggestion as to the possibility of a general morality of
fiduciary law holds,129 the engagement of power-conferring rules
results in the formation of relationships which, by virtue of char-
acteristics held in common with other fiduciary relationships, justify
the imposition of fiduciary duties. But we should not think that this
exhausts the morality of the power-conferring rules that enable
fiduciary administration. Rather, the morality of these rules likely
varies by type or subtype of relationship. That is, each type of
relationship that equity deems fiduciary will have its own special
morality, the latter being a matter, in part, of the particular values
implicated by the provision the law makes for (a) formation of
relationships of that type and (b) tailoring of mandates within the
type.
The notion that the power-conferring rules that enable fiduciary
administration implicate considerations of special morality should
be uncontroversial. The moral reasons for providing for the forma-
tion of guardianship relationships—for example, via the subtype of
adoptive parenthood—reflect the special moral interests prospective
guardians have in formally assuming care and custodial responsibil-
ity for wards, and the special moral interests the latter have in
ensuring that their basic needs are provided for by someone with
legally recognized responsibility and authority over their care, to
say nothing of the public interest in regularizing adoptive care of
dependents.130 The moral reasons for enabling the formation of
nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts reflect the special moral
interests that philanthropists, donors, and volunteers have in a
fixed structure for the fiduciary administration of charitable invest-
ments and activities, as well as the public interest in the promotion
of charitable giving.131 And one could similarly catalogue distinct
128. See Frankel, supra note 110, at 795. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
(AM. L. INST. 2003).
129. See supra Part II.B.
130. See Adoption Law: United States, LIBR. OF CONG. (June 9, 2015), https://www.loc.gov/
law/help/adoption-law/unitedstates.php [https://perma.cc/YL7W-RPTE].
131. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAWS OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1:18 (2020); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TRUSTS §§ 348-49, 368 (AM. L. INST. 1935); cf.
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sets of moral reasons reflecting a wide range of values served by
power-conferring rules that enable other forms of fiduciary adminis-
tration. To fail to notice the special morality of these rules is, in
many cases, to miss their most immediate and pressing moral point
or purpose.
D. Why Structural Biplanarity Cannot Be Ignored
Most theorists have a decided preference for parsimony.132 So, too,
do fiduciary theorists. Even if they might be persuaded that the
general morality of fiduciary duties is pluralistic, fiduciary theorists
could be reluctant to accept the complexity introduced by recogni-
tion of fiduciary law’s structural biplanarity and the special
morality of power-conferring rules.133 After all, to do so is to rec-
ognize that the morality of fiduciary law is, to a considerable extent,
eclectic, allowing for a stable undercurrent of considerations of
general morality that apply to all fiduciary relationships while the
wider morality of the field varies by relationship type and
subtype.134 This makes theory construction arduous and the result-
ing wide-angle view rather messy.
With this in mind, one can anticipate the following skeptical
question: Why does fiduciary theory need to account for the special
morality of power-conferring rules? After all, we have established
that fiduciary law operates in relation to these rules, but the rules
are not in themselves fiduciary.135
The answer lies in the close connection between fiduciary duty-
imposing rules and nonfiduciary power-conferring rules. As noted
earlier, the relationship characterization through which equity
extends fiduciary duties is secondary: equity provides its own gloss
on relationships, the primary legal form and character of which is
defined otherwise at law or in equity.136 So, too, the functions of
fiduciary duties are secondary. Fiduciary duties secure the formal
Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76 (“Fiduciary duties are imposed when public policy encourages
specialization in particular services.”).
132. See generally Sam Cowling, Ideological Parsimony, 190 SYNTHESE 3889 (2013).
133. See supra Part II.C.
134. See supra Part II.B.
135. See supra Part II.A.
136. See supra Part II.A.
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and practical integrity of the various forms of relationship and
association to which they attach.137 They thus help to ensure that
the power-conferring rules through which these forms are consti-
tuted are used as intended relative to salient interests that support
the content of those rules and conditions placed on their exercise.
It turns out, then, that the general morality of fiduciary duties
and the special morality of nonfiduciary power-conferring rules are
not severable. Considerations of general morality—of non-domina-
tion, welfare, and autonomy138—are put in issue by all fiduciary
relationships insofar as they implicate personal representation.139
But personal representation is not a construct subsisting on air; it
arises relative to, and plays out with respect to, specific mandates
under which a fiduciary is authorized to do something in particular
for and on behalf of another.140 One cannot understand personal
representation in practice, or fiduciary law’s role in safeguarding it,
without attending to the power-conferring rules that enable the
various mandates under which fiduciaries act and without taking
notice of the special morality of these rules.
This point can also be made by analogy. The connection between
general and special morality in fiduciary law is akin to that between
the general morality of tort law141 and the special morality of the
legal forms it sometimes protects. Consider the tort of inducing
breach of contract. As a matter of general morality, one can say that
this tort, like others, is responsive to the value of autonomy.142 But
as a matter of moral theory this is incomplete and unsatisfying.
That is because an account of the morality of this tort must also
incorporate the morality of contract. For one can always ask: Why
is contract (or why is autonomous action, when realized through
contracting behavior) worthy of tort law’s protection? An answer will
require that one attend not just to general characteristics of tort
137. Cf. Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76 (noting how regulatory regimes are designed
around specific fiduciaries, ensuring against misappropriation and inadequate performance).
138. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
139. Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40.
140. See Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76 (“Fiduciaries must be entrusted with power over
the entrustors or their property ... to enable fiduciaries to serve their entrustors.”).
141. See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 917 (2010).
142. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Freedom, Choice, and Contracts, 20
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 595, 632 (2019).
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liability and its structure but to the morality of the interests that
tort law protects, and in this case the latter is, in part, a matter of
the morality of contract.
III. LOCI OF VALUE IN FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS
Having established a framework for analysis of the morality of
fiduciary law, it remains for us to identify loci of value that contour
that morality. One common approach to analysis of the morality of
legal rules—especially duty-imposing rules—is to focus on their
content and triggering conditions as well as the sanctions for (or
consequences otherwise of) rule violation. So, for example, when tort
theorists debate the morality of tort law, they often do so by exam-
ining the moral content of the duty of care, conditions governing the
incidence and scope of the duty, and the remedial default of
damages for breach.143
There is something to this strategy, at least with respect to free-
standing, duty-imposing rules of the sort that dominate tort and
criminal law. But it proves problematic in relation to duty-imposing
rules that establish terms of interaction for legal forms of relation-
ship and association. Here, specification of the form shapes the
incidence, scope, and effect of the duty-imposing rules that are
partly constitutive of it.144 This, in turn, makes it difficult, if not
impossible, to analyze the morality of a duty-imposing rule inde-
pendently of that of the form in which it is embedded. I shall
therefore assume for present purposes that the morality of duty-
imposing rules embedded within legal forms must be understood in
light of the morality of the forms themselves.145
143. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAW & PHIL. 37,
37-38 (1983); Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J.
349, 349-50 (1992); Ripstein, supra note 40, at 656-57; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 141,
at 918; John Gardner, What Is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice, 30 LAW
& PHIL. 1, 50 (2011); Mark A. Geistfeld, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Normative Source of
Modern Tort Law, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1517, 1519-21 (2016).
144. See supra Part II.A; see also Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at 368; Frankel, supra
note 110.
145. I allow, without commenting further here, for the possibility that the morality of a
duty-imposing rule embedded within a form may not simply receive or reflect the morality of
the form but may contribute to it sui generis through an ancillary moral impact on the
intentions, motivations, or behavior of the parties. See Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact
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Fiduciary duties are not stand-alone duties. They are occasioned
by fiduciary relationships, binding fiduciaries in the performance of
their mandates.146 Elsewhere, I have argued that fiduciary duties
serve, in part, to secure the expectation that fiduciaries prove to be
reasonably good representatives of those for whom they act under
a mandate.147 Given that fiduciary duties are attached by equity to
various legal forms of relationship (for example, trust, corporation,
partnership, guardianship, and agency),148 I shall assume that their
morality is primarily a function of that of the general and special
morality of fiduciary relationships.
To the extent that fiduciary law regulates relationships of
representation,149 it facilitates and governs the practice of represen-
tation in decision-making, much of which concerns the care and
custody of persons and the administration, investment, and dis-
position of property.150 One might therefore speculate that the
general morality of fiduciary law is a matter of the values—
including, again, those of non-domination, welfare, and auton-
omy151— put at issue by interpersonal and group representation.
But it should be remembered that an implication of structural
biplanarity is that one must attend to the special morality of
particular fiduciary relationship types—and associated power-
conferring rules—in analyzing the wider morality of the field.152
Bearing all of this in mind, in what follows I will argue that
identifying loci of value in fiduciary relationships is a matter of
identifying morally salient interests in the formation, performance,
and termination of a fiduciary mandate. More specifically, I suggest
the need to attend to, and to differentiate between, the interests of
parties, third parties, and the general public as a matter of general
and special morality as they shift across the lifespan of a relation-
ship. To the extent that the law proves responsive to these interests,
Theory of Law, 123 YALE L.J. 1288, 1290 (2014).
146. See supra Part II.A.
147. See Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40.
148. See supra Part II.A; see also Frankel, supra note 110, at 795; Fiduciary Duties, supra
note 76.
149. See Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40.
150. See FINN, supra note 88, at 1-3; Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76.
151. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
152. See supra Part II.D.
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it does so through rules that define and adapt entry into, execution
of, and exit from fiduciary relationships.
A. Interests of Parties
In analyzing the morality of fiduciary law, it seems natural to
begin with the interests of parties to fiduciary relationships.153 By
“parties,” I mean to include fiduciaries and beneficiaries, as well as
grantors and enforcers.154 And it should be noted that artificial as
well as natural persons may be parties155 to the extent that the na-
ture of a mandate and its objects permit it.156
I have suggested that it is best to analyze the morality of
fiduciary law by examining considerations of general and special
morality separately across different stages in the lifespan of a
fiduciary relationship.157 Different sets of rules shape and govern
the conduct of parties and nonparties at various stages of a relation-
ship, and salient interests shift, too.158 I shall therefore adopt this
approach in what follows.
153. It makes sense to begin with the parties in that duty-imposing rules apply
correlatively between fiduciary and beneficiary (or third-party mandate enforcer) and in that
power-conferring rules enable the formation of a relationship treated by law and equity as
personal to the parties.
154. Enforcers are persons granted legal standing to enforce a fiduciary mandate despite
being neither grantors nor beneficiaries. See Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 543 n.95. Trust
protectors are an example. See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and
Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L.REV. 2761, 2763 (2006). Recognizing that recourse to enforcers
is relatively rare, I will set consideration of their interests to one side here. However, it may
be noted that enforcers generally protect the interests of grantors, beneficiaries, or the public
(in the case of mandates for public benefit); they therefore fulfill a second-order fiduciary
function (that of a concerned “watcher,” at remove from first-order mandate performance). See
id. at 2762-63; Paul B. Miller, Regularizing the Trust Protector, 103 IOWA L. REV. 2097, 2098
(2018).
155. See Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, The Corporation as a Category in Private Law,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PRIVATE LAW THEORY 429 (Hanoch Dagan & Benjamin C.
Zipursky eds., 2020).
156. Cf. Miller & Gold, supra note 119 (discussing governance mandates).
157. See supra Part II.C.
158. Compare Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at 381 (listing ways fiduciary
relationships may be formed), with RAFAEL CHODOS, THE LAW OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES ch. 4 (2d
ed. 2000) (ebook) (describing termination of fiduciary duties).
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1. In Mandate Formation
At formation, grantors can have different intentions, the facilita-
tion of which engages a variety of values. As a matter of general
morality, we might say that the freedom to confer a mandate on a
fiduciary enables grantors more effectively to provide for their own
welfare or that of someone for whom they wish to make provision.159
But generalization is difficult because grantors’ interests at for-
mation are served by power-conferring rules that are specific to
different types of fiduciary relationships, and the intentions enabled
by these rules will depend in part on how the law defines the legal
form in which the rules are embedded.160 Thus, the special morality
of fiduciary relationships, insofar as it reflects grantors’ interests,
will be pluralistic across, and often within, different areas of
fiduciary administration.
This being allowed, it is perhaps worth noting that grantors will
often have, with respect to a specific mandate, one or more of
several kinds of intention.161 First, when a grantor establishes a
mandate for the benefit of others, her intention will often be either
to provide in some way for the welfare of specific beneficiaries or to
provide for advancement of causes of general public interest.162 In
either case, the grantor confers a mandate on a fiduciary in order to
provide for people or causes that matter to her, and so underlying
power-conferring rules enable her to meet a moral obligation of care
effectively or to actualize her moral identification with certain
persons or causes.163 Second, when a grantor establishes a mandate
for her own benefit, her intentions again might vary. She might
159. See Dagan & Hannes, supra note 13, at 92-93; Robert H. Sitkoff, An Economic Theory
of Fiduciary Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 197,
198.
160. See supra Part II.C; see also Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at 382-83
(“[C]omplexities make generalizations difficult.”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An
Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 909 (“[F]iduciary obligation is
inevitably tied to the particular context in which it arises.”); Frankel, supra note 110, at 797
(“The differences among fiduciaries may be so great that treating them as a group would
require a very high level of generality.”).
161. See Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 543 (listing different configurations of fiduciaries
and mandates).
162. See id. at 519-22, 525.
163. See, e.g., id. at 551.
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believe or trust that the fiduciary will more effectively or efficiently
decide for her benefit in relation to the subject matter of the
mandate.164 She might also, or alternatively, engage a fiduciary so
that she may devote her time, attention, and energies to pursuits
that she values more.165 Or she might have planned for fiduciary
administration of her person or property in the event of her own
incapacity.166 Finally, when a grantor joins with others in engaging
a fiduciary under a new or ongoing mandate focused on objects of
common interest, she may do so because fiduciary administration is
entailed by the legal form of association under which the group is
organized or in recognition that it enables effective organization.167
In sum, the special morality of fiduciary relationships will depend
in part on which—or which combination—of grantor intentions and
interests a set of power-conferring rules enables.
The interests of fiduciaries at formation are rather more straight-
forward. As a matter of general morality, it may be noted that
fiduciaries must freely undertake their mandates in order to be held
to them, and they usually do so as a form of remunerated employ-
ment or on a voluntary basis as a matter of moral obligation to, or
identification with, grantors or beneficiaries.168 Their interests
might reasonably be thought to include the generic ones we all have
in employment or in identifying with others through acts of service.
However, generalization is difficult here, too. More particularly,
specific rules governing the undertaking of fiduciary mandates, and
those constraining the nature and scope of powers that may be con-
ferred on a fiduciary, will impact the terms under which fiduciaries
do or may serve, depending on the kind of mandate.169
As a matter of special morality, the intentions and motivations
that a fiduciary might have for undertaking a mandate will vary
164. See Dagan & Hannes, supra note 13, at 98-99.
165. See id. at 104-05; see also Hanoch Dagan, Fiduciary Law and Pluralism, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 833, 844-47.
166. See Nina A. Kohn, Fiduciary Principles in Surrogate Decision-Making, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 249, 249-54.
167. See supra Part II.C; see also Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 527.
168. See Miller, Dimensions, supra note 9, at 184-85; Miller, Identification, supra note 1,
at 352. See generally Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Undertakings, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 79, at 71; James Edelman, When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126
LAW Q. REV. 302 (2010).
169. See Harding, supra note 168, at 76-77.
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depending on its nature and his relationship to other parties. For
example, it is still relatively common for those with filial ties to a
grantor or beneficiary to serve as executor or trustee for the
purposes of estate or trust administration of family property.170
Filiation is also a factor in the appointment and undertaking of
guardianships.171 Finally, it might be noted that some serve as
fiduciaries in part because of their identification with fiduciary
social roles172—for example, the physician’s identification with the
social role of healer,173 or the lawyer’s identification with the roles
of intermediary and advocate.174 However, more commonly, fidu-
ciaries act mostly or in significant part for reason of their being
promised remuneration or other employment perquisites that are
acceptable to them.175 In either case, power-conferring rules leave it
for the fiduciary to determine whether to serve and to negotiate—
when feasible—over terms of their service.176 Thus, in sum, the
special morality of fiduciary relationships will also depend on
which—or which combination of—intentions and motivations
foreseeably factor in a fiduciary undertaking a mandate.
As for beneficiaries, their interests at formation are rather more
nebulous than one might expect given their recognized significance
in law after formation. And that is because, prior to formation, some
beneficiaries might have moral expectancies—for example, ground-
ed in need, a moral right, or other basis of desert—of fiduciary
administration, but these expectancies are not treated in law as
170. Will Executor Duties FAQ, FINDLAW (Dec. 6, 2019), https://estate.findlaw.com/estate-
administration/will-executor-duties-faq.html [https://perma.cc/44SZ-BLAA]; Karen Hube,
Picking a Trustee, Family or Banker?, BARRON’S (Nov. 30, 2009), https://www.barrons.com/
articles/SB125936551043767209 [https://perma.cc/FP98-FQJQ]. For a discussion, see gen-
erally Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm of Inheritance Law, 80 N.C. L. REV. 199
(2001).
171. See Kohn, supra note 166, at 257.
172. See generally Matthew Harding, Fiduciary Law and Social Norms, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 797; Hardimon, supra note 81, at 362.
173. See Clarissa Hsu, William R. Phillips, Karen J. Sherman, Rene Hawkes & Daniel C.
Cherkin, Healing in Primary Care: A Vision Shared by Patients, Physicians, Nurses, and
Clinical Staff, 6 ANNALS FAM.MED. 307 (2008); Stephen C. Schimpff, The Physician as Healer,
IN-TRAINING (Aug. 1, 2014), https://in-training.org/doctors-orders-physician-healer-stephen-c-
schimpff-md-7525 [https://perma.cc/L2ZP-84JC].
174. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071-73 (1976).
175. See Miller, Dimensions, supra note 9, at 184-85.
176. See Frankel, supra note 110, at 801.
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material to the founding of a fiduciary mandate.177 When a benefi-
ciary has a powerful moral expectancy, and so a recognizable moral
stake in the formation of a mandate that is responsive to their
(usually welfare-related) interests, the expectancy normally oper-
ates on the grantor or fiduciary as a matter of moral obligation.178
It gives a grantor a moral reason to establish a fiduciary mandate
for the benefit of the beneficiary and, additionally or alternatively,
gives the fiduciary a moral reason to undertake it.179
2. In Mandate Performance
All fiduciary relationships center on mandates that call for per-
formance.180 Fiduciaries are not people who just happen to be in a
position of influence over others. Rather, they are people with
mandates to perform, being called to use judgment in the exercise
of legal powers in pursuit of purposes established at law or by
grantors.181
The performance of fiduciary mandates is shaped by power-
conferring and duty-imposing rules.182 Power-conferring rules make
provision for variation of the terms on which a mandate will be
performed.183 They include rules governing the variation of con-
tracts, charters, and other documents, as well as rules that stipulate
the circumstances under which courts or a party (usually the
beneficiary or grantor) can give binding directions to a fiduciary.184
177. With the possible exception of children, whose need of parental care has been said to
ground the law’s default ascription of parental authority and responsibility to birth parents.
See generally Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA.L.REV. 2401
(1995); Lionel Smith, Parenthood Is a Fiduciary Relationship, 70 U.TORONTO L.J. 395 (2020).
178. Cf. Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 17-23 (2000)
(defining levels of legal obligatory altruism).
179. Cf. id.
180. See Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at 382-83; Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40;
Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 516.
181. See Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at 382-83; Miller, supra note 18, at 38-40;
Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 516.
182. See supra Part I.E.
183. See Daniel Clarry, Mandatory and Default Rules in Fiduciary Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 435, 435-41.
184. The latter are sometimes misleadingly characterized as a “fiduciary” duty rather than
an example of a retained power relating to amendment or enforcement of mandate purposes.
See, e.g., Alan R. Palmiter, Duty of Obedience: The Forgotten Duty, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457
(2010-2011); Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors’ Duty of Obedience,
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The duty-imposing rules with which we are concerned are those
establishing fiduciary duties.
Turning now to the task of identifying the moral interests of
various parties in mandate performance, we may begin again with
grantors. The interests of grantors that are germane to the general
and special morality of power-conferring rules remain salient for the
duty-imposing rules (fiduciary duties) that constrain mandate
performance. Duties of loyalty and care, in particular, make it more
likely that a fiduciary will abide by the purposes that a grantor has
stipulated for a mandate, and thus that a fiduciary will give effect
to the grantor’s intentions.185 Duties that require respect for the
intentions of grantors engage values that I identified with the
general morality of fiduciary law, including those of freedom from
domination (or negative liberty) and autonomy.186 Relatedly, but not
incidentally, these duties also serve to protect the values advanced
by grantor choice as a matter of special morality (that is, the various
specific commitments and pursuits of value that may be provided for
by a grantor by way of conferral of a fiduciary mandate).187 Whether
objects valued by a grantor are realized will turn on mandate per-
formance, and fiduciary duties are focusing devices, reminding
fiduciaries that they are beholden to the grantor’s choices in per-
forming a mandate save and unless they resign from it.188
As for beneficiaries, the points made earlier about fiduciary duties
responding, as a matter of general morality, to the value of freedom
from domination holds for beneficiaries, too.189 However, whereas in
respect of grantors, the value of non-domination is primarily im-
plicated in terms of respect for their intentions, in the case of ben-
eficiaries it is chiefly a matter of the fiduciary’s respect for the
beneficiary’s person and recognition that certain of the benefi-
ciary’s welfare interests have been entrusted to him.190 Second,
30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1677 (2009).
185. See Miller, supra note 18, at 41-42.
186. See supra note 116 and accompanying text; see also KELLER, supra note 81 (discussing
the ethics of special responsibilities).
187. On autonomy and (moral) self-constitution, see generally RAZ, MORALITY, supra note
25; CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, SELF-CONSTITUTION (2009).
188. See Rob Atkinson, Obedience as the Foundation of Fiduciary Duty, 34 J. CORP. L. 43,
45-49 (2008).
189. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 177, at 2430-32.
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beneficiaries have an interest in the realization of moral expectan-
cies that arise or ripen on the establishment of a fiduciary mandate
for their benefit.191 Beneficiaries have different welfare interests at
stake in different kinds of mandates, and the extent of their
interests and claims to solicitude vary by mandate as well.192 But all
beneficiaries have an interest in well-founded expectancies being
realized through due performance of mandates by fiduciaries.193
As a matter of special morality, the welfare interests of beneficia-
ries, for which provision may be made under a fiduciary mandate,
and values, which give these interests their moral salience, will vary
by mandate type (that is, the kinds of powers that may be conferred
and objects specified for a mandate), as well as choices made by
lawmakers or grantors in specifying mandate terms.194 But what-
ever the beneficiary’s interests, their position will be materially
advanced or set back through mandate performance by a fiduciary,
and so, in turn, the beneficiary will be protected by fiduciary duties
to the extent that the latter require that the fiduciary focus on
achieving mandate objects or purposes.195
Turning, finally, to fiduciaries, their interests in mandate
performance correlate closely with those in formation. Fiduciaries
who undertake a mandate for reason of their moral identification
with the grantor or beneficiary may find moral fulfillment in sound
performance.196 Those who serve for the sake of fixed remuneration
have an interest in continuing receipt of same and, in some cases,
in performance-based compensation.197 This being noted, one should
not simply suppose that the relevant moral interests of fiduciaries
will be advanced in proportion to their success in performance,
much less that fiduciaries who look for it will always find moral
fulfillment in their work when it is objectively successful. Indeed, a
191. See Paul Faulkner, Fiduciary Grounds and Reasons, in FIDUCIARIES AND TRUST, supra
note 7, at 17, 22-23.
192. See id. at 17.
193. See Fiduciary Duties, supra note 76, at 127 (noting that fiduciaries would not be
entrusted with powers if the probable loss would exceed the value gained from the
relationship).
194. See Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 551-53; Miller, Identification, supra note 1, at
382.
195. See Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 516.
196. See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 177, at 2433.
197. See Frankel, supra note 110, at 811-12.
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fiduciary may well find performance presents unexpected moral
burdens—ones that threaten other, higher moral commitments.198
3. In Mandate Termination
With this in mind, we may now consider the interests of grantors,
beneficiaries, and fiduciaries, respectively, in rules that enable and
govern the termination of fiduciary relationships. A couple of
preliminary observations: first, the power to terminate varies by
type of mandate; and second, the exercise of such a power by a
fiduciary is governed by their fiduciary duties.199 In some fiduciary
mandates (for example, those conferred upon agents), the grantor
retains a power to unilaterally terminate the mandate.200 In others
(for example, those conferred on trustees), the grantor may lack this
power, but a power of termination will lie with courts as a part of
their equitable supervisory jurisdiction to regulate mandate perfor-
mance.201 Again, under some fiduciary mandates, beneficiaries will
have the power to terminate a fiduciary or demand the windup of a
mandate, or beneficiaries will have the right to petition a court for
termination and replacement of a fiduciary or for windup of the
mandate.202 But, in other cases, beneficiaries will lack the power or
right to petition for termination or windup.203 Finally, ordinarily a
fiduciary enjoys a liberal power to resign from, but not to terminate,
a mandate, subject to compliance with duties of care and loyalty.204
For example, a colorable resignation motivated by self-interest may
198. See Andrew S. Gold, Accommodating Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND FIDUCIARY
LAW, supra note 79, at 185, 187-92; Andrew S. Gold, The Internal Limits on Fiduciary Loyalty,
65 AM. J. JURISPRUDENCE 65, 72-74 (2020).
199. See generally Pearlie Koh, Once a Director, Always a Fiduciary?, 62 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
403 (2003).
200. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01, cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 2006).
201. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (AM. L. INST. 2003). See generally DANIEL
CLARRY, THE SUPERVISORY JURISDICTION OVER TRUST ADMINISTRATION (2018).
202. See generally CLARRY, supra note 201.
203. For example, a single shareholder cannot unilaterally bring about the windup of a
corporation with multiple shareholders, though equity provides for the right to petition for
windup on equitable grounds. See Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension:
Selection of the Appropriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CORP. L. 285, 295-98 (1990).
204. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR.L. REV. 1209, 1224 n.39
(1995).
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result in fiduciary liability for acts after resignation.205 Similarly, a
fiduciary who resigns from a mandate without taking due steps to
ensure succession might face liability for damages suffered by a
beneficiary.206
The power-conferring rules that enable termination and resigna-
tion from fiduciary mandates are, like those that enable formation,
responsive to a variety of interests, some of which are salient as a
matter of general morality, others as a matter of special morality.
For example, when a grantor or beneficiary has a power to unilater-
ally terminate a mandate or the fiduciary’s authorization under it,
the power-conferring rule supports their respective autonomy
interests (for example, the grantor’s interest in effectuation of her
intentions), but it also serves their interests in non-domination (a
liberal power of exit here being a bulwark against an inherent risk
of domination).207 When courts have jurisdiction to remove and re-
place a fiduciary or to wind up a mandate, it is usually exercised to
protect the interests of beneficiaries or grantors when self-protection
is not viable.208 Finally, the autonomy interests of fiduciaries
support a wide power of unilateral resignation.
Each of the parties will also have interests in rules enabling
liberal termination and resignation as a matter of special morality
varying by mandate type. For example, a patient’s power to with-
draw consent to a treatment relationship has value not just as a
function of an abstract autonomy interest but also in virtue of her
specific moral interest in bodily integrity.209 Similarly, in many con-
texts, the nature of a specific mandate, or what is required by way
of performance, will mean that a fiduciary’s power to resign serves
specific freedoms, including freedom of religion and conscience.210
205. See Can. Aero Serv. v. O’Malley, [1974] S.C.R. 592, 607, 613-16 (Can.).
206. See Michael K. McChrystal, Lawyers and Loyalty, 33 WM.&MARY L.REV. 367, 417-19
(1992).
207. On the importance of liberal powers of exit for members of organizations, see generally
ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970).
208. See generally Nigel Furey, The Statutory Protection of Minority Shareholders in the
United Kingdom, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 81 (1987) (discussing the history of the windup
remedy and shareholder protection in English law); Alvin E. Evans, The Termination of
Trusts, 37 YALE L.J. 1070 (1927-1928) (discussing reasons for terminating trusts).
209. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990).
210. For discussion in the context of lawyers, see generally DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
AND HUMAN DIGNITY (2007).
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Finally, turning to the duty-imposing rules (fiduciary duties) that
condition resignation by limiting its effects on liability, here it may
simply be observed that equity’s refusal to countenance opportunis-
tic resignation protects the interests of grantors and beneficiaries in
faithful fiduciary representation.211 Equity will recognize as effective
the exercise of a power of resignation in that the fiduciary will be
deemed to have forfeited authority enjoyed under the mandate, but
will insist that the fiduciary remains answerable for liabilities
sought to be circumvented through the expedient of resignation.212
B. Interests of Third Parties
The formation, performance, and termination of fiduciary man-
dates can implicate the interests of third parties in a variety of
ways. By third parties, I mean individual persons or definite
subcategories of persons other than parties to a fiduciary relation-
ship. The subcategories of persons are those who come to be in
contemplation of law by virtue of the frequency of their interaction
with parties and are presumed to have some commonality of
interest. Examples include involuntary creditors213 and bona fide
purchasers for value.214
1. In Mandate Formation and Termination
Generally speaking, the interests of third parties are implicated
in two ways by the power-conferring rules that enable the formation
and termination of fiduciary mandates and by the duties that con-
strain performance by fiduciaries. The interests of third parties are
implicated in these rules with respect to agency and accountability.
211. See Koh, supra note 199, at 424-26.
212. See id. at 426-27, 431.
213. See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor’s Bargain, 80 VA.L.REV. 1887
(1994); Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be
Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (2004).
214. See generally Pilcher v. Rawlins [1872] 7 Ch. App. 259 (Eng.); Peter Jaffey, The Nature
of Knowing Receipt, 15 TRUST L. INT’L 151 (2001); Aruna Nair & Irit Samet, What Can
‘Equity’s Darling’ Tell Us About Equity?, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF
EQUITY, supra note 87, at 264.
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Briefly, if a third party is to interact—and so, to exercise personal
agency—with a party to a fiduciary relationship with full awareness
of the legal consequences of his actions, he will need to know with
whom he is dealing and on what basis.215 Because fiduciary
relationships entail representation, they present inherent risks to
the autonomy interests of third parties; a third party, unaware that
he is dealing with a person acting in a fiduciary capacity, may
falsely assume otherwise (that is, that the dealings are direct ones)
or fail to make inquiries before acting so as to irrevocably change his
normative position.216
Furthermore, the establishment of a fiduciary mandate will
sometimes—due to the combined effect of rules providing for arti-
ficial personality, agency, and limited liability—significantly impact
accountability. In some circumstances, a third party might be
barred from seeking redress from a person who wronged them (for
example, a fiduciary) and be required to seek redress from another
person of whom they had no knowledge and with whom they had no
direct interaction (for example, a grantor or beneficiary).217 In other
cases, a third party might be without an avenue of recourse for a
wrong, as when the asset partitioning effect of a rule is such as to
place beyond reach resources that would otherwise be available to
satisfy a claim.218 In either case, the third party will be disabled
from holding accountable a person who would otherwise be answer-
able at law and who might be morally answerable for a wrong.
215. As exemplified in treatment of liability under pre-incorporation contracts. See Nathan
Issacs, The Promoter: A Legislative Problem, 38 HARV. L. REV. 887, 891-93 (1925); Eddie R.
Flores, Note, The Case for Eliminating Promoter Liability on Preincorporation Agreements,
32 ARIZ. L. REV. 405, 405-08 (1990); Wilfred M. Estey, Pre-incorporation Contracts: The Fog
Is Finally Lifting, 33 CAN. BUS. L.J. 3 (2000). See generally Michael J. Whincop, Of Dragons
and Horses: Filling Gaps in Pre-incorporation Contracts, 12 J. CONT. L. 223 (1998).
216. Cf. Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 540.
217. For example, the corporate doctrine of limited liability may shield tortfeasor directors
from individual suit. See Alan Schwartz, Product Liability, Corporate Structure, and
Bankruptcy: Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 714-
15 (1985) (discussing how the concept of limited liability may cause firm owners to
“externalize tort risks to victims”); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited
Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1880 (1991) (arguing that
limited liability is not defensible in relation to corporate torts).
218. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U.L.REV. 434, 438, 466 (1998); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust
Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 428, 436
(Lionel Smith ed., 2013).
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Distinguishing impact on agency from that on accountability is
helpful in disentangling third-party interests.219 Given that fiducia-
ry relationships impact third parties largely through the alteration
of default rules pertaining to personal agency and accountability, it
should be unsurprising that, as a matter of general morality, third-
party interests at formation and termination coalesce around
notice220 and self-help.221 By default, individuals are assumed to act
in legally consequential ways on the footing of their own personality
and to be personally accountable for their acts on this basis (that is,
on the basis that their acts and associated liabilities are borne
personally).222 Many fiduciary relationships are supported by rules
that alter these defaults, in different ways, in order to enable
personal representation (that is, the execution of a mandate under
which the fiduciary acts for and on behalf of others).223
As a matter of general morality, voluntary creditors and others
who interact willingly with a party to a fiduciary relationship have
interests—sounding in agency and accountability—in knowing
whether default rules that govern interpersonal interactions are
applicable or instead have been superseded or modified by rules
enabling fiduciary representation.224 These interests are generally
well served by rules promoting notice (for example, those requiring
the use of signifiers or other tokens).225 But notice is an imperfect
salve in a world in which much legally consequential conduct is
not, and cannot reasonably be expected to be, foregrounded by
careful deliberation and negotiation. In many, if not most, of our
219. For general analysis of equity’s treatment of third parties, see Ben McFarlane &
Andreas Televantos, Third Party Effects in Private Law: Form and Function, in 1 OXFORD
STUDIES IN PRIVATE LAW THEORY 107 (Paul B. Miller & John Oberdiek eds., 2020).
220. See Joseph R. Long, Notice in Equity, 34 HARV. L. REV. 137, 138 (1920).
221. See Janet O’Sullivan, Rescission as a Self-Help Remedy: A Critical Analysis, 59
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 509, 511-12, 531-32, 542 (2000).
222. See Miller & Gold, supra note 155.
223. See generally id.; Paul B. Miller, Corporations, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE NEW
PRIVATE LAW (Andrew S. Gold et al. eds., 2020). Note, however, that fiduciaries are not
invariably granted the authority to bind those for whom they act (for example, physicians and
other professional fiduciaries usually have a more limited form of authority to act relative to
the person of the beneficiary or her affairs). See Elaine B. Krasik, Comment, The Role of the
Family in Medical Decisionmaking for Incompetent Adult Patients: A Historical Perspective
and Case Analysis, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 539, 561-62 (1987).
224. See Frankel, supra note 204, at 1246 n.106.
225. See id.; see also Long, supra note 220, at 140.
2021] THE MORALITY OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1389
interactions with others, we trust in appearances and assume the
continuing applicability of default rules. The same holds true for
third parties interacting with persons who might be parties to a
fiduciary relationship.226 Thus, third parties without actual or con-
structive notice have moral interests in being protected in their
reliance on default rules governing interpersonal interactions that
would apply absent the existence of a fiduciary relationship.
The moral calculus is different when the interactions affecting a
third party are nonvoluntary. Victims of torts and crimes receive
little to no protection from rules requiring notice. Instead, their
moral interests, such as protection from and recompense for harm,
are primarily served by restoration of default rules governing
interpersonal accountability for tortious and criminal wrongs.227
2. In Mandate Performance
Whether or not third parties interact with a party to a subsisting
fiduciary relationship on a voluntary basis, they will have a general
moral interest in fiduciaries taking due notice of their rights and
reasonable expectations in the performance of a fiduciary mandate.
Relatedly, they have reason to be concerned about harm and other
setbacks to their interests by a fiduciary’s overestimation of what is
required by way of compliance with fiduciary duties (for example,
mandate performance involving morally blind or blinkered loyalty
to a grantor or beneficiary).228 These considerations support side
constraints that make fiduciaries liable for avoidable harms suffered
by third parties not justified or excused by fiduciary duties.
Alternatively, they may support fiduciary standards of conduct that
give fiduciaries discretion to act in cognizance of the moral interests
of third parties.229
226. See Frankel, supra note 204, at 1246 n.106.
227. See Criddle, supra note 15, at 1019.
228. This is exemplified in the debate over zealous advocacy of client interests that involves
immoral or inequitable conduct by lawyers. See generally Tim Dare, Mere-Zeal, Hyper-Zeal
and the Ethical Obligations of Lawyers, 7 LEGAL ETHICS 24 (2004); David Luban, Fiduciary
Legal Ethics, Zeal, and Moral Activism, 33 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 275 (2020).
229. For analysis of the discretion afforded to corporate directors under Delaware corporate
fiduciary law, see generally Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005).
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3. As a Matter of Special Morality
The nature and moral salience of third-party interests varies to
some extent by type of fiduciary mandate. For example, the division
of legal and equitable title, or the presence of uniform equitable
constraints on legal title,230 that characterizes fiduciary administra-
tion of trust property has a peculiar set of implications for con-
veyancing that can, and routinely does, impact third parties in ways
not captured by the considerations of general morality noted
above.231 The same holds true for third parties in their interactions
with fiduciaries in other contexts, whether employees of corpora-
tions232 or family members affected by substitute decision-making
in healthcare.233 In each case, to fully appreciate the morality of the
position of the third party, one must understand how their interests
are implicated by a mandate of a given type.
C. Interests of the General Public
The moral stakes held by the general public in fiduciary relation-
ships are disparate but relate primarily to the aggregate moral
impact234 of mandate formation and performance.
In thinking about the moral impact of legal rules, care must be
taken to distinguish two ways in which legal rules are morally con-
sequential on a society-wide basis.235 One is a function of the
230. On the debate over how best to characterize the basis on which trustees hold title to
trust property, and the equitable interest of beneficiaries in the latter, see generally Ben
McFarlane & Robert Stevens, The Nature of Equitable Property, 4 J. EQUITY 32 (2010) and
J.E. Penner, The (True) Nature of a Beneficiary’s Equitable Proprietary Interest Under a Trust,
27 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 473 (2014).
231. See generally McFarlane & Televantos, supra note 219; Percy Bordwell, Equity and
the Law of Property, 20 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1934).
232. See Aditi Bagchi, Exit, Choice, and Employee Loyalty, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND
FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 79, at 271, 279, 284 (arguing that mandatory terms imposed in
employment contracts for the benefit of third parties advance public policy interests).
233. See generally Krasik, supra note 223; HILDE LINDEMANN NELSON &JAMES LINDEMANN
NELSON, THE PATIENT IN THE FAMILY (1995).
234. By aggregate moral impact, I mean the society-wide moral upshots (moral goods and
harms) of power-conferring and duty-imposing rules implicated in fiduciary law. These
include, but are not limited to, effects on social utility. See, e.g., The History of Utilitarianism,
STAN. ENCYC. OF PHIL. (Sept. 22, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-
history/ [https://perma.cc/J9GU-FGLM].
235. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, The Social Consequences of Common Law Rules, 95 HARV. L.
2021] THE MORALITY OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1391
aggregate impact of a rule on those whose personal interests are
affected, for better and for worse, by reliance on and use of the rule,
including via formal and informal enforcement. The public interest
here is indirect, being a function of whether, on the whole, fiduciary
relationships succeed in advancing or protecting the interests of
individuals.236 The second is a matter of the impact of a rule on the
fate of public and quasi-public goods.237 Here, the public interest is
direct, being a function of whether certain types of fiduciary
relationships—those featuring mandates in which stipulated
purposes are matters of public rather than private advantage238—
succeed by virtue of the rules that enable and constrain them.239 In
these relationships, mandate performance is a matter of securing,
producing, or distributing public and quasi-public goods.
1. In Mandate Formation and Termination
With respect to the indirect public interest in power-conferring
rules that enable the formation of mandates established for private
advantage, the fate of the public interest is a matter of the aggre-
gate moral good and harm that these rules bring about for parties
and third parties.240 Moral good encompasses protection and
REV. 1717, 1718 (1982) (“[T]he intellectual and institutional constraints on common law
adjudication require one to be very cautious in attributing major social and economic
consequences to common law rules.”); Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of
Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1603, 1605-06 (2000) (discussing approaches “capable
of accounting for the influences of legal rules on social norms and individual values”).
236. For example, whether the various legal forms that enable fiduciary administration of
the affairs and property of incapable persons succeed in enabling satisfaction of moral
obligations of care for the vulnerable, or whether those that enable fiduciary administration
of property of persons of full capacity succeed in enhancing the autonomy of persons relieved
of the burden of judgment passed on to a fiduciary, and whether they result in a net
enhancement of beneficiaries’ personal welfare.
237. See generally BRIAN BARRY,POLITICALARGUMENT (1965); ELINOR OSTROM,GOVERNING
THE COMMONS (1990); Philip Pettit, The Common Good, in JUSTICE AND DEMOCRACY, at 150
(Keith Dowding et al. eds., 2004).
238. For example, charitable trusts as well as governmental and nonprofit corporations.
239. See Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 533-35.
240. It will be recalled that moral advantage and disadvantage are a function of the
advancement of, or setback to, the morally salient interests of parties and third parties. See
supra Part I. It should also be noted that the moral calculus will differ by relationship type
to the extent that parties and third parties have different moral interests in different kinds
of fiduciary mandate, these being a matter of the special morality of same. See supra Part
II.C.
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realization of moral values that lend the interests of persons in
mandate formation their salience, including the welfare effects of
relationship formation for the parties, enhancement or protection of
their autonomy, enablement of effective cooperation, and nourish-
ment of filial bonds. Moral harm encompasses the setback of moral
values that lend interests their salience, including those just noted
(which typically relate to the parties) as well as those which un-
derlie the agency- and accountability-related moral interests of third
parties.
By contrast, the direct public interest in power-conferring rules
that enable the formation of mandates established for public ad-
vantage is a function of the aggregate impact of enabling (a) private
provision for matters of public advantage (for example, through
settlement of charitable trusts and organizations);241 or (b) limited
delegation of governmental functions to private fiduciaries.242
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that fiduciary administration
is an effective way in which to safeguard, produce, and distribute
public and quasi-public goods, and that it does not crowd out or
inhibit other mechanisms of administration, the public will have an
interest in rules that enable both kinds of mandate.
2. In Mandate Performance
The indirect public interest in performance of a given kind of
fiduciary mandate, and in the duty-imposing rules that safeguard
it, will depend on whether anticipated personal moral advantages
of mandate performance for the parties are realized, and if so, to
what extent and at what rate, factored in light of moral setbacks
suffered by parties and third parties.
Whether the direct public interest is served will depend almost
entirely on whether a mandate for fiduciary administration of public
or quasi-public goods has been successful with respect to the pro-
tection, production, and distribution of same. And this will, in part,
be a matter of the effectiveness of fiduciary duties in promoting due
241. See generally MATTHEW HARDING, CHARITY LAW AND THE LIBERAL STATE (2014);
KATHRYN CHAN, THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE NATURE OF CHARITY LAW (2016).
242. See Miller & Gold, supra note 119, at 531-35. See generally John Barratt, Public
Trusts, 69 MOD. L. REV. 514 (2006).
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performance of these mandates.243 If apt standards of conduct have
been specified, compliance with these standards is robust, and
enforcement is reasonably effective, fiduciary administration is
likely to be morally beneficial to the public. But if standards are
poorly formulated, enforcement is weak, or the culture of compliance
is poor, fiduciary administration is likely to be morally disadvanta-
geous or harmful.
CONCLUSION
In other work, I have noted the need for attention to normative
questions about fiduciary law.244 In this Article, I have provided a
framework within which these questions might be identified and
pursued. My aim has been to develop a schema that supplies clarity
but is equal to the conceptual complexity and doctrinal variegation
that distinguishes fiduciary law from other heads of legal and
equitable obligation.
The framework distinguishes two kinds of legal rules—duty-
imposing and power-conferring, respectively—that are prevalent in
fiduciary law, and urges analysis that draws on currents in the
general jurisprudential literature on law and practical reason.
The framework clarifies that the legal rules through which fi-
duciary law operates are characterized by structural biplanarity—
that is, the interaction of rules operating at two different levels.245
Fiduciary duty-imposing rules supplied by equity reveal a consis-
tent conceptual structure but arise and function relative to differing
sets of nonfiduciary power-conferring rules.246 The latter are, in
turn, constitutive of primary legal forms of relationship and as-
sociation. I have suggested that structural biplanarity is material
to the morality of fiduciary law in two ways. First, it implies that
the morality of the field taken in whole encompasses considera-
tions of general morality (that is, those germane to all fiduciary
243. For general discussion and analysis of principles common to private and public
fiduciary administration, see generally Miller, supra note 76.
244. See generally Paul B. Miller, New Frontiers in Private Fiduciary Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF FIDUCIARY LAW, supra note 1, at 891.
245. See supra Part II.
246. See supra Part II.
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relationships)247 as well as considerations of special morality (that
is, those germane to the power-conferring rules enabling of particu-
lar types of fiduciary relationships).248 Second, it implies that the
morality of fiduciary law is normatively complex (varying in ac-
cordance with the special morality of different relationship types)
and suggests that it is normatively pluralistic (characterized by its
responsiveness to more than one, and often several, values).249
The framework also explains that the morality of fiduciary law is
understood in relational terms, insofar as fiduciary duties are
premised on fiduciary relationships and aim to secure integrity in
the performance of fiduciary mandates.250 It is for this reason that
I outline loci of value in fiduciary relationships—namely, the
morally salient interests that persons might have in the formation,
performance, and termination of fiduciary relationships.251
My ambition has been to provide a structure for analysis of the
morality of fiduciary law. But I want to be explicit about the limits
of this ambition, particularly because acknowledgement of them
suggests avenues for future scholarship. There are three points, in
particular, that I would like to emphasize.
The first is that I have not here attempted to exhaustively iden-
tify or argue for the values that animate the morality of fiduciary
law. As to general morality, I have simply argued that it is plausible
to think—as others have suggested—that non-domination, welfare,
and autonomy are core values, and I have noted further that there
is reason to doubt whether any one of these values alone suffices to
explain or justify our law. As to special morality, it would be
impossible to delineate in so short a piece the morality of even a
small subset of fiduciary relationship types. And, so, I have been
contented here simply to point out that (a) each type or subtype of
fiduciary relationship implicates its own special morality and
(b) that a theorist cannot defensibly ignore considerations of spe-
cial morality given that fiduciary duties secure the integrity of
247. See supra Part II.B.
248. See supra Part II.C.
249. See supra Part II.D.
250. See supra Part I.A.
251. See supra Part III.
2021] THE MORALITY OF FIDUCIARY LAW 1395
representation in the relationship types to which they have been
attached by equity.
The second point is that I have not differentiated interpretive
from critical analyses of core normative issues in the field. And, so,
I have not claimed to have uncovered the posited morality of
fiduciary law (the values to which fiduciary law is responsive). Nor
have I undertaken criticism of fiduciary law and its posited morality
(the values to which fiduciary law ought to be responsive). Rather,
I intend the framework to be used to identify what matters (mor-
ally) to fiduciary law, whether to our appreciation of the justification
of the rules we have or to our understanding of the ways in which
extant rules require reform.
The third and last point is that I have focused on the nature and
morality of legal rules in fiduciary law without saying much about
how they may be understood relative to functions performed by, and
values served in, equity more generally. In other work, I have
commented on how one might understand fiduciary law relative to
the general functions of equity (that is, its correction and sup-
plementation of law).252 But I do not there, or here, consider
whether, and if so, how the general morality of fiduciary law
squares with leading analyses of the morality of equity, whether in
terms of conscience,253 opportunism,254 equality,255 or the rule of
law.256 These questions beckon though, like others,257 I would
caution that equity—understood as a complex ancillary system of
law—is just as unlikely to reward reductive normative analysis as
are its products, fiduciary law being just one example.
252. See generally Miller, supra note 87.
253. See generally IRIT SAMET, EQUITY (2018).
254. See generally Smith, supra note 103.
255. See generally Dennis Klimchuk, Aristotle at the Foundations of the Law of Equity, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY, supra note 87, at 32.
256. See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law, 36 NOMOS 120 (1994);
Matthew Harding, Equity and the Rule of Law, 132 LAW Q. REV. 278 (2016).
257. See generally Lionel D. Smith, Equity Is Not a Single Thing, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF EQUITY, supra note 87, at 144.
